In this paper, a geometric function is introduced to reflect the attenuation speed of impact of one firm's default to its partner. If two firms are competitions (copartners), the default intensity of one firm will decrease (increase) abruptly when the other firm defaults.
Introduction
The rapid expansion in recent years of market for the credit derivatives had led to a growing interest in the valuation of these instruments including the credit default swaps(CDS).The reference issuers and the derivative issuers not only have default risk, but also correlate in some way. As remarked by Jarrow and Yu (2001) ,"an investigation of counterparty risk is incomplete without studying its impact on the pricing of credit derivatives". We can distinguish three different approaches to model default correlation in the literature of intensity credit risk modeling. The first approach to model default correlation makes use of copula functions. A copula is a function that links univariate marginal distributions to the joint multivariate distribution with auxiliary correlating variables. Li (2000) was probably the first to explicitly use the concept of copulas in the context of basket default derivatives pricing.
The second approach introduces correlation in firms' default intensities making them dependent on a set of common variables X t and on a firm specific factor. These models have received the name of conditionally independent defaults (CID) models, because conditioned to the realization of the state variables X t the firm's default intensities are independent as are the default times that they generate. for example Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Lando (1994 Lando ( , 1998 .
The last approach to model default correlation, contagion models, relies on the works by Davis and Lo (1999) and Jarrow and Yu (2001) . It is based on the idea of default contagion in which, when a firm defaults, the default intensities of related firms jump upwards. Leung and Kwok (2005) gave the analytic solution for the CDS premium for Jarrow and Yu (2001)model by employing the change of measure which was introduced in Collin-Dufresne (2004). But it is unrealistic for them to assume that one firm's default intensity keep a constant jump after the other firm defaults. In this paper, we introduce a geometric function to reflect the attenuation impact of one firm's default to other firms' default intensities. In our model, one firm's default will influence other firms' default intensities and the impact will decrease until extinct as time goes on. That is to say after a period of time, one firm's default intensity will depend the firm itself while the impact of other firm's default will disappear. The model is more realistic.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a geometric function to reflect the attenuation impact of one firm's default to its partners, and give emphasis on the case when the two firms are competitions. The joint and marginal distributions of the two firms' default times are got by employing the change of measure which was introduced in Collin-Dufresne (2004). In section 3, we price the CDS premium using the conclusion of section 2 and get the analytic solution. The paper is ended with conclusion in the last section.
A Model for Dependent Default with Geometric Attenuation function
We consider an uncertain economy with a time horizon of T * described by a filtered space
t=0 , P ) satisfying F = F T * , where P is the risk-neutral(equivalent martingale) measure in the sense of Harison and Kreps (1981) , that is, all security prices discounted by the risk-free interest rate r t are martingale under P.
In this section, we construct a two-firm model with default correlation. Suppose firm B and firm C have high direct linkage which are competitions or copartners. The default time of firm i (i=B,C) is denoted by τ i which posses a strictly positive F t -predictable intensity process λ Let
, then we can get that
is an F t -local martingale and the conditional survival probability of firm i is given by
The default correlation between firm B and firm C is characterized by the correlated default intensities: To calculate the joint distribution of the two default time of firm B and firm
we adopt the change of measure introduced by Collin-Dufresne (2004), defining a firm-specific probability measure P i which puts zero probability on the pathes where default occurs prior to the maturity T. Specifically, the change of measure is defined by
where P i is a firm-specific(firm i) probability measure which is absolutely continuous with respect to P on the stochastic interval [τ i , +∞). To proceed the calculation under the measure P i , we enlarge the filtration to G i = (G i t ) t≥0 as the completion of σ(H t ∨ F t ) t≥0 by the null set of the probability measure P i . One can show that Z i T is a uniformly integrable P-martingale with respect to G i T and almost surely strictly positive on [0, τ i ) and almost surely strictly equals to zero on [τ i , +∞)(see Collin-Dufresne (2004)). Under the default risk structure specified in Eqs. (3) and (4), the survival probabilities of firm B and firm C are defined recursively through each other and this leads to the phenomenon of "looping default". Under the new measure P B defined by Eq.(5), λ 
and the joint density is
Proof:
So we can get
If b 2 = 1, the above equation equals to
where E C denotes the expectation under the measure P C . The first equation follows from the definition of P C , and the fourth from the fact that λ B t = b 0 for t < t 2 under P C . By a similar argument for t 2 ≤ t 1 ≤ T , the joint distribution is given by
The differentiation of P (τ B > t 1 , τ C > t 2 ) with respect to t 1 and t 2 gives the joint density of the default times
The proof is completed.♯ Remark 1 It is worth noting that if cb 0 = bc 0 , then f (t 1 , t 2 ) is not continuous on the plane
Corollary 1 Under the assumption of Proposition 1, if b 1 = c 1 = 0, then the joint distribution of default times (τ B , τ C ) with the default intensity defined by Eq. (3)(4) 
in other words, when
Proof We can get (11) by taking limit in Eq. (9) or Eq. (10) as c → 0
Proof We can get Eqs. (13) and (14) by taking t 1 = 0 and t 2 = 0 in Eqs. (9) and (10) respectively. ♯ Remark 2 The first term in Eq. (13) denotes the firm-specific survival probability, and the second one denotes the increment of firm B's survival probability because of the default of firm C and the geometric attenuation speed. As the result of
the increment of firm B's survival probability satisfies
From the above inequation we can get that the increment of firm B's survival probability at time t will be no more than
. An analogous argument also holds for firm C.
Section 3 CDS Valuation in the Model of Dependent Default with Geometric Attenuation function
In this section we use the conclusion of Section 2 to price the premium of a CDS. A CDS is a contract agreement between protection buyer and seller, in which the protection buyer pays periodically to the protection seller a fixed amount fee(swap premium pr spread) asking for a payment when the reference asset defaults. A institute can use a CDS to transfer, elude and hedge the credit risk of a risky asset(or basket of risky assets) from one party to the other. So a CDS is a very important instrument to manage credit risk.
Suppose interest rate r t is a constant r. Assume that party A holds a corporate bond and faces the credit risk arising from default of the bond issuer (reference party C). To seek protection against such default risk, party A enters a CDS contract in which he agrees to make a stream of periodic premium payments, known as the swap premium to party B (CDS protection seller). In exchange, party B promises to compensate A (CDS protection buyer) for its loss in the event of default of the bond (reference asset). Without loss of generality, we take the notional to be $ 1 and assume zero recovery under default. Firm B pays firm A after a settlement period δ when the reference asset c defaults. Furthermore in Leung and Kwok (2005) , they conclude the expression for the swap premium has little dependence on the default intensity of the protection buyer, so we impose that during the entire contract, firm A doesn't default.
The default intensity processes of firm B and C are given by Eqs. (3) and (4) in special cases
Since it takes no cost to enter a CDS, the value of the swap premium S(T ) is determined by
where {T 1 , . . . , T n } are the swap payment dates with 0 = T 0 < T 1 < . . . < T n = T, T i − T i−1 = ∆T, T + δ < T * , and δ is the length of settlement period. Here τ C + δ represents the settlement date at the end of the settlement period. The first term in Eq. (15) gives the present value of the sum of periodic swap payments(determined when either B or C defaults or at maturity) and S(T )A(T ) is the present value of the accrued swap premium for the fraction of period between τ C and the last payment date. The present value of accrued swap premium is given by
In the following, we will calculate all the expectations in Eq.(16). For simplicity we denote
It is easy to get from Eq.(6)
From Eq.(11) it can be found
and
That is to say
Take Eqs. (18), (19) and (21) into (15), we can get Proposition 2 Assume the default buyer doesn't default during the entire contract, and the default intensities of B (the protection seller) and C(protection buyer) are given by Eq.(3) and (4), then the swap premium is given by
where A(T ) is given by Eq.(21). In this paper, a geometric function is introduced to reflect the attenuation speed of impact of one firm's default to its partner. If the two firms are competitions (copartners), the default intensity of one firm will decrease (increase) abruptly when the other firm defaults. As time goes on, the impulsion will decrease gradually until extinct. In this model, the joint distribution and marginal distributions of default times are derived by employing the change of measure, so can we value the fair swap premium of a CDS and get the analytic expression.
